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ABSTRACT
Religious studies’ collective advocacy on behalf of diversity and inclusion stands in poignant 
contrast to its persisting exclusionary ethos (within most quarters of the field) concerning 
questions of method. A legacy of prohibitions in religious studies about who can study 
religions and about how they must proceed when doing so has tended to curb innovation. 
Born of protectionism or special pleading or outright religious impulses, such prohibitions 
have skewed the field in favor of the idiosyncratic over the recurrent, of the idiographic 
over the systematic, and of the interpretive over the explanatory. My long-standing interest 
in the promise of the cognitive sciences for studying religion has been, in part, to redress 
those imbalances. Redressing imbalances, however, does not involve dismissing the idio-
syncratic, the idiographic, or the interpretive, but only suggests, first, that they are not the 
whole story and, second, that greater attention to the recurrent, the systematic, and the 
explanatory will enrich – not eliminate – our understandings and our inquiries. The first of 
those two propositions follows from the second. My aim in this paper is to substantiate that 
second proposition.  
Keywords: cognitive science of religion, explanatory pluralism, interpretive exclusivism, 
empirical findings.
RESUMO
A defesa coletiva dos estudos religiosos em favor da diversidade e da inclusão está em con-
traste pungente com seu ethos excludente persistente (dentro da maioria dos quadrantes 
do campo) em questões de método. Um legado de proibições em estudos religiosos sobre 
quem pode estudar as religiões e sobre como elas devem proceder ao fazer isso tendem a 
refrear a inovação. Nascidas do protecionismo ou de impulsos religiosos especiais ou articu-
lados, tais proibições distorceram o campo em favor do idiossincrático sobre o recorrente, 
do idiográfico sobre o sistemático e do interpretativo sobre o explicativo. Meu interesse 
na promessa das ciências cognitivas para estudar religião tem sido, em parte, corrigir esses 
desequilíbrios. A correção dos desequilíbrios, no entanto, não envolve descartar o idiossin-
crático, o idiográfico ou o interpretativo, mas apenas sugere, primeiro, que eles não são a 
história completa e, segundo, que maior atenção ao recorrente, sistemático e explicativo 
enriquecerão – não eliminarão – nossos entendimentos e nossas investigações. A primeira 
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Explanatory pluralism
The first broad line of philosophical argument in de-
fense of my contention that systematic explanations about 
recurrent patterns in religious systems will enhance our un-
derstanding of religious phenomena (developed in Lawson 
and McCauley, 1990; McCauley, 2000, 2013; McCauley 
and Lawson, 1996) follows from general positions in the 
philosophy of science about the chara er and consequences 
of cross-scientific relations and their implications for ex-
planations in science (McCauley, 1986, 1996, 2007). CSR 
and the cognitive sciences generally are but instances of 
cross-scientific investigations to which these general posi-
tions’ verdicts apply.  
Both CSR and the cognitive sciences, more generally, ex-
emplify the explanatory pluralism that prevails in cross-scien-
tific contexts throughout the sciences (McCauley, 2013).  For 
new purposes pertaining to their own inquiries, scientists fre-
quently enlist the conceptual, theoretical, analytical, meth-
odological, experimental, and evidential resources developed 
within other sciences that are pursued at what are, sometimes, 
quite distant analytical levels. The various cognitive sciences 
span multiple analytical levels, generating and integrating in-
sights from the biological, psychological, and social sciences 
– from cognitive neuroscience and comparative psychology 
at the biological level, to cognitive and cultural anthropolo-
gy at the socio-cultural level, and everything in between. They 
have assembled an extensive collection of investigative tech-
niques and developed pictures both of human behavior and 
of the structure and operations of the human mind that are 
far more penetrating and insightful than those available here-
tofore. Their impact has been transformational in linguistics 
and economics, and they hold comparable potential for the 
study of politics, for the study of society and culture generally, 
and for the study of religion.  
The resulting integrative accounts of religious phenom-
ena in CSR certainly extend our understanding of the variety 
of factors that may be influencing religious thought and ac-
tion in diverse locales. Those accounts also increase the range 
of resources available for situating phenomena conceptually 
and theoretically.  Explanatory pluralism highlights the many 
means by which scientific investigators exploit the varied re-
sources of the sciences and scientists’ opportunistic approach 
to evidence, in particular.  
Explicitly aiming in cross-scientific settings to sup-
plant prevailing theories and the approaches that inspire 
them (e.g., Bickle, 2003) ignores both the normative and 
historical considerations that animate explanatory plu-
ralism. In particular, it contravenes scientists’ bountiful 
opportunism regarding evidence. The replacement of the-
ories and approaches that these positions envision would 
only reduce the number and variety of assets available in 
cross-scientific inquiries. More importantly, perhaps, the 
history of science supplies few, if any, precedents for such 
aspirations, especially once the pertinent inquiries enjoy 
some measure of intellectual and institutional stability 
(McCauley, 2007, 2013).  
This is not to say that the reduction or the elimination 
of theories in science never occurs. They sometimes do, but 
the consequences of the first, i.e., reduction, and the con-
texts in which the second, i.e., elimination, occur carry no 
deleterious implications for the relationship between CSR and 
conventional religious studies. With regard to the first, the 
smooth mappings between cognitive theories and interpre-
tive proposals implicated in a scientific reduction serve to 
vindicate the interpretive account in the  ecific context it 
addresses. With regard to the second, the replacement, in-
deed, the outright elimination of theories and their accom-
panying ontologies is the outcome of intense competition 
within some science over time between clearly incompatible 
theories (McCauley, 1986, 1996, 2007). Historically, such 
intense competition between what Thomas Kuhn (1970) 
called “incommensurable” alternatives tends to be compar-
atively short-lived (often but a decade or two) in the exper-
imental sciences (Thagard, 1992). Concentrated experi-
mental research reveals the new competitor’s strengths and 
liabilities relative to those of the prevailing theory, and ei-
ther the relevant scientific community eschews the upstart 
or the field undergoes a scientific revolution that eliminates 
that previously prevailing theory and at least a few of its on-
tological commitments.  
Crucially, the sorts of cross-scientific contexts in which 
any incompatibilities between cognitive theories and inter-
pretive proposals would arise at some point in time are not, 
historically, situations that occasion scientific revolutions. 
Substantial conceptual and theoretical incompatibilities in 
cross-scientific contexts may generate selection pressures 
between analytical levels, but the history of science indicates 
that such inter-level pressures rarely, if ever, suffice to bring 
about such stark outcomes. No scientific consideration re-
quires such a draconian approach to resolving theoretical 
incompatibilities across analytical levels in science. Instead 
of these selection pressures pushing in the direction of revo-
lutionary upheaval at some analytical level, they may just as 
well ignite efforts to forge cross-scientific connections, e e-
cially when the research programs in question are pursued 
destas duas proposições segue a segunda. Meu objetivo neste artigo é fundamentar essa 
segunda proposição.
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within scientific disciplines that have long-standing intellec-
tual and institutional legacies.
The consistent emphasis in CSR on explicitly formulat-
ing theories in detail is an unqualified virtue. It helps to clarify 
the points where, whatever their provenance, theoretical pro-
posals may make contact as well as whether points of contact 
are likely to result in conflicts or connections.  
Whether through providing speculative interpretive 
proposals, or counter-instances that challenge cognitive 
hypotheses, or recommendations for refining such hy-
potheses, or focused scrutiny on relevant phenomena, or 
through simply presenting basic findings to be made sense 
of, standard work in religious studies and the History of 
Religions can engage in myriad collaborative enterprises 
with cognitive scientists of religion. Historians’ findings 
about both persisting and extinct religions, in particular, 
are a test-track on which, sooner or later, cognitive theo-
ries must run (Whitehouse and Martin, 2004; Pyysiäinen 
and Uro, 2007; Martin and Sørensen, 2011; Czachesz and 
Uro, 2013; Martin, 2015).  
The sorts of findings in CSR that this paper surveys as 
well as those in the cognitive sciences generally offer schol-
ars of religion plentiful resources for inspiring and refining 
interpretive proposals. The cognitive sciences have collec-
tively uncovered grounds for contextualizing, qualifying, 
supplementing, and, in some circumstances, even super-
seding many of the stock assumptions of commonsense 
psychology that inform interpretive approaches to human 
mental life, discourse, and a ion. Presumptions that seeing 
is believing, that the conscious mind matters most, that the 
mind’s operations can go on in comparative isolation from 
the body, that memory is retrieval of fixed snapshots of past 
events, that possessing false memories follows from either 
some functional impairment or intentional perversity, that 
we mean what we say, that people have privileged knowl-
edge about the workings of their own minds, and so on must 
all be hedged in one way or another most of the time. That 
alone is probably not news to humanists. What the cognitive 
sciences deliver, though, are increasingly detailed accounts 
of why and when and how and how much they should be 
hedged – detailed accounts which have withstood exa ing 
empirical scrutiny and experimental tests.3  
The cognitive sciences pose no barriers to humanists’ 
interpretive projects.  Familiarity with those sciences’ accom-
plishments should abet the sophistication of interpretive pro-
posals (Lawson and McCauley, 1990, Chapter one).4  
Avoiding the quandaries of 
interpretive exclusivism
The second line of philosophical argument defending 
CSR’s potential to enrich inquiries addressing religious phe-
nomena (developed in Lawson and McCauley, 1993, and 
McCauley, 2000) concerns its abilities to supply constructive 
responses to moral, epistemic, and metaphysical quandaries 
that other prominent approaches in the study of religion face. 
These include crises of conscience, riddles of identity, epis-
temic over-confidence, and metaphysical muddles.
E. Thomas Lawson and I (1993) pointed to the crisis 
of conscience in anthropology and to the inadequacies of in-
terpretive methods for addressing it. In the subsequent two 
decades, scholars’ moral sensitivities have appropriately ex-
panded beyond questions of colonialism to include persisting 
forms of oppression of women, people of color, people of var-
ious racial, ethnic, and religious backgrounds as well as the 
poor, the disabled, and people with any of a variety of sexual 
and gender identities (who do not benefit from heterosexual 
privilege as a result), wherever they may reside. These forms of 
oppression no less merit our moral concern, but they are no 
better confronted by anti-scientific ideology than was colo-
nialism in the mid and late twentieth century.  
Anti-scientific enthusiasts’ claims, first, that with sci-
entific knowledge comes power to oppress and, second, 
that the interests of oppressors and scientists often coin-
cide are both surely true. But stopping there neglects the 
further truth that no human undertaking and, certainly, 
no human undertaking on the scale that modern science is 
pursued comes close to the level of self-policing that science 
achieves. Of course, that self-policing pertains most directly 
to epistemic rather than moral matters,5 but, crucially, to the 
extent that scientific rationality and morality both turn on 
ideals about honesty and truth (however the latter should 
be chara erized), they are of a piece. Its self-policing helps 
to ensure that science is unsurpassed as a tool for obtain-
ing knowledge about the world of our experience and that, 
barring its obliteration (a fairly high price to pay for oppres-
sors who putatively rely on science as a means to power), 
its verdicts are neither wholly nor finally subordinate to the 
powerful. Anti-scientific enthusiasts’ suggestions – that the 
best response to the use of science to oppress is to abandon 
science and its ideals – are counter-productive. For example, 
the cognitive sciences can aid us, not least, in gaining a deep-
3 Oddly, many interpretivists do not object when psychoanalytically oriented thinkers make similar claims on the basis of far less evi-
dence arising from carefully designed tests.
4 However pointed the criticisms, the controversies (Norenzayan, 2014; Staussberg, 2014) that have swirled around the synthetic propos-
als of Ara Norenzayan’s Big Gods (2013) illustrate the sort of constructive exchanges that the interaction of CSR and religious studies can 
yield. None of the issues are settled. All of the auditors and, I suspect, all of the participants as well have benefitted. 
5 That, however, is not to imply that the scientific community is unconcerned with the moral and political implications of its work. Or-
ganizations such as the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Center for Science in the Public Interest have played a valuable and 
constructive role in enhancing public understanding of scientific issues and in contributing to thoughtful public policies.
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er understanding of human moral psychology (e.g., Graham 
et al., 2013).
Over the last few decades scholars of religion have rec-
ognized that, to the extent that the field of Religious Studies 
has itself collaborated with cultural anthropology and pur-
sued parallel projects, it has been something of an unindicted 
co-conspirator in these crises of conscience. Lawson and I ar-
gue, though, that religious studies has an additional problem 
concerning its identity as an intellectual project. Long wary 
of being categorized with either theology or the social scienc-
es, Religious Studies programs have mostly sought a haven 
within the humanities. Traditionally, the principal defense for 
that position has maintained that religious studies has either 
a unique object of study, a unique method for studying that 
object, or both. Those assumptions, however, have undergone 
withering criticism from multiple quarters – not only from 
cognitive scientists of religion. Arguments about the exclusiv-
ity of religious materials and the methods for their study have 
faced at least two major objections.  
The first objection concerns the very notion that dis-
tinctively religious materials even exist. Cognitive scientists 
of religion and many recent contributors to religious studies 
question the viability of ‘religion’ as an analytical category and 
its (metaphysical) status as an object of study. Although their 
reasons for skepticism that “religion” designates a unified body 
of phenomena differ, they are consistent and complementary 
grounds for that negative conclusion.  
The by-product theory is the earliest and remains the 
most prominent theoretical orientation in the cognitive sci-
ence of religion (Boyer, 1994, 2001; Guthrie, 1980, 1993; 
Lawson and McCauley, 1990; McCauley and Lawson, 2002; 
Whitehouse, 1992, 1995). The by-product theory holds that 
religions, like various other cultural arrangements from folk-
lore to militaries, engage a host of ordinary cognitive systems 
(theory of mind, contamination avoidance, kinship recogni-
tion, linguistic competence, etc.) that are in place on the basis 
of considerations that have nothing to do with one another 
and, crucially for current purposes, considerations that have 
nothing to do with religion. Those cognitive capacities’ exercise 
in religious contexts results in by-products of their normal func-
tioning. Whether they concern anthropomorphism (Guthrie, 
1993), a ion representation (Lawson and McCauley, 1990), 
episodic and autobiographical memory (Whitehouse, 2004), 
or all of these and more (Boyer, 2001), these cognitive capac-
ities exist in human minds because they enable people to deal 
with the  ecies’ perennial problems. It follows that, at least 
from a cognitive per ective, neither religion nor religiosity is 
some stable, uniform sensibility or pattern of behavior.  
Some dissidents in religious studies raise a different set 
of considerations for questioning the analytical purchasing 
power of talk about religion. They argue that ‘religion’ is a 
concept born of the scholarly enterprise of the modern west-
ern world.  The dissidents (e.g., Fitzgerald, 2000) note that 
the concept is tarnished by virtue of its association with the 
crises of conscience. “Religion” is an analytical term deployed 
by scholars in the west in an area of study that bolsters the 
projects of colonialists and capitalists, let alone the projects 
of proselytizers.  
Their complaints, however, are not only moral. The 
sorts of features that receive scholars’ attention favor the ar-
rangements of the religions of the book, primarily, and of the 
world religions, secondarily, without attention to the under-
standings, pra ices, contexts, and lives of the members of the 
myriad small-scale societies around the world and through-
out human history. Dissidents point out that the concept of 
religion does not seem to exist in many cultures; nor, they 
note, is there a similar word in many languages.  It is precise-
ly the plethora of apparently relevant stories, beliefs, a ions, 
pra ices, social arrangements, institutions, and more as well 
as the variety of ways that they are regarded from one setting 
to the next that foil scholars’ interminable attempts even to 
define “religion” (Saler, 2008).  
From this point, the argument is straightforward. Dissi-
dents regard the lack of consensus among scholars and their 
persistent failure to define the field and its primary object of 
study as grounds for the analytical vacuity of the concept ‘re-
ligion.’ Without any defensible, coherent grounds for identi-
fying what should count as religion, the traditional proposal 
that “religion” and its cognates pick out exceptional phenome-
na, whose study requires exceptional methods, seems forlorn. 
Casting the discussions at the level of particular religions, 
in order to circumvent the problems associated with religion 
construed as some general domain of human thought and en-
deavor, introduces its own metaphysical complexities (Mc-
Cauley, 2000). What kinds of things are religions? Where, 
exactly, do they exist? How are their boundaries determined? 
What is the basis of their continuities over time? What, if 
anything, whether beliefs, pra ices, heritages, etc., is essen-
tial? Who counts as a Muslim or a Christian or a Buddhist 
and, more importantly, who gets to decide? The latter two 
questions have acquired considerable poignancy in a time 
when religiously motivated assaults routinely seize head-
lines throughout the world, yielding never-ending arguments 
about who should count as a true X, where “X” designates the 
name of some particular religious affiliation or other. Such 
talk about who is a “true” X (a true Muslim, a true Christian, 
etc.) or what makes for “true” X (true Islam, true Christianity, 
etc.) is transparently normative and that normativity is trans-
parently theological. That leads straightforwardly enough to 
the second objection.  
The second objection to the traditional claims about the 
unique chara er of religious materials and the necessity of 
extraordinary methods for their study holds that the positive 
case made in their behalf faces a dilemma. Either the argu-
ments commit the fallacy of petitio principii (i.e., they assume 
what they set out to defend) or they depend upon what are, 
finally, fundamentally theological conceptions of religious 
matters, with repeated references to “the holy,” “the sacred,” 
“the transcendent,” etc. As a way around this dilemma, many 
scholars recruited broader (but, in most regards, parallel) 
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arguments deployed across the humanities typically about the 
singular chara er either of (human) subjectivity (e.g., Nagel, 
1974) or of the meaningful (e.g., Geertz, 1973) or of both. 
These considerations were alleged, on the positive side, to re-
quire phenomenological and hermeneutic methods and, on 
the negative side, to constitute a barrier to scientific approach-
es. Without reviewing the academic culture wars of the past 
fifty years, let it suffice here to make four observations.  
First, hermeneuticists’ (and their post-modernist off-
spring’s) preoccupations with the text and with its interpre-
tation as the dominant metaphor for conceptualizing all 
meaningful materials – so that, for example, religion in all 
of its facets is construed as textual – leaves scholars not with 
matchless methods but with woefully deficient ones.  That is 
because, whatever religion is, it is both much more and much 
less than texts.6 This seems transparent with regard both to 
the ancestry of religion in the prehistory of our  ecies and 
to what appears to be religious goings-on among non-literate 
groups. But that is not the end of it. The myriad a ivities, 
items, and settings, let alone the mental states, experiences, 
and utterances that do not even remotely resemble texts but 
that play such vital roles in people’s lives, in non-literate and in 
literate societies, operate far beyond the borders of the herme-
neuticists’ textual spotlight.  
An emphasis on the textual also inspires a particular 
view of the past. History, on this view, is textually based. 
History is concerned with the production of texts that get 
to their interpretations of past events and agents primari-
ly through reflections about texts – whether previous texts 
about those events and agents or texts that those agents pro-
duced themselves. With such an approach, the cultural tradi-
tions, the salient events, and the past lives of the non-literate 
risk invisibility. In a scholarly sphere in which both human 
origins and countless human groups are, in effect, invisible, 
the religions of large scale, literate societies and their textu-
ally documented traditions inevitably hog the attention. The 
imbalanced distribution of scholarly attention goes largely 
unnoticed, because, quite literally, the non-textual is mostly 
nowhere to be seen.
Second, it is worth noting that even if the positive con-
clusions about the  ecial status of the subjective and the 
meaningful are sound, they render religious subjectivity and 
religious meaning nothing but sub-categories of far more 
sweeping considerations concerning humanistic pursuits 
overall. They provide no case (that does not circle back to co-
vert theology) for picking the religious varieties out for  ecial 
disciplinary treatment. The humanists who champion the 
subjective and the meaningful have far more ambitious aims 
than merely insulating religion. They intend to safeguard the 
researches of all of the humanities.
Third, the negative conclusions about the inabilities of 
the sciences to address such matters is an overrea ion to a 
form of scientific exclusivism (scientism) and a conception of 
the sciences (logical empiricism) that the cognitive sciences 
and their pra itioners neither endorse nor exemplify. The re-
jection of unsatisfactory accounts of science and of its reach 
does not require the rejection of science generally, or of the 
cognitive sciences, or of CSR.  
Fourth, as I noted at the outset, such an exclusionary 
ethos is ill-advised, because the cognitive sciences and CSR 
offer invaluable methods and findings for enhancing our un-
derstandings both of a ects of subjectivity and of the making, 
having, and using of meaning in human life in general and in 
religious contexts in particular. In the absence of compelling 
arguments for interpretive exclusivism or impenetrable sub-
jectivity and in the face of the myriad successes of the cognitive 
sciences and of CSR, assertions about science’s putative inabil-
ity to further illuminate these matters begin to look like reac-
tionary protectionism of a field, instead of profound insights 
about either human life or the limits of scientific inquiry.  
In the sections that remain, I will situate and summarize 
some of those successes of CSR, i.e., new theoretical propos-
als, durable, replicated findings, and promising results in that 
field. The best evidence for the usefulness of these cognitive 
scientists’ methods is the resilience and the fruitfulness of the 
ensuing research. A fair sample of the numerous methods 
that CSR has employed will emerge in the course of reporting 
on this research. Its explanatory pluralism will be transparent. 
The development of CSR as 
a scientific enterprise with 
new experimental findings 
generating theories from the 
bottom-up
CSR arose from a range of theoretical proposals (Boy-
er, 1994, 2001; Guthrie, 1980, 1993; Lawson and McCau-
ley, 1990; McCauley and Lawson, 2002; Whitehouse, 1992, 
1995) that share at least three assumptions:
(1)   that employing the theories, methods, and findings 
of the cognitive sciences to study religious thought 
and behavior would yield valuable new insights,
(2)   that the mind has no department of religion, i.e., 
that the mind has no systems, structures, or process-
es  ecifically dedicated to managing religious mate-
rials, and
(3)   that many forms of religious cognition are by-prod-
ucts of the operations of cognitive systems that are in 
place for reasons having nothing to do either with one 
another or with how they figure in religious matters.
Consistent with the second and third assumptions, 
these various theoretical works address a wide variety of 
6 Post-modernists’ worries about the status of texts were not a mere coincidence.
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religious matters and a comparable array of cognitive func-
tions and systems.  
CSR began very much as a top-down endeavor. To 
their credit theoreticians both welcomed attempts to test 
their hypotheses and explored relevant empirical evidence 
themselves (Boyer and Walker, 2000; McCauley and Law-
son, 2002; Whitehouse and Laidlaw, 2004; Whitehouse and 
Martin, 2004; Whitehouse and McCauley, 2005). They also 
worked to bring empirical evidence to bear on the compari-
sons of theories (e.g., McCauley and Lawson, 2002). In doing 
so, they demonstrated that the research enterprise in which 
those theories figured qualified as empirical science. Still, most 
of this work involved appeals to ethnographies, case studies, 
and historical illustrations, which, because of their particular-
ity, disclose only thin slices of the vast landscape of phenom-
ena that pertain to the assessment of any particular theory 
and, because of origins independent of the theories in ques-
tion, fail to illuminate many of the parts of that landscape that 
are of greatest interest. The original theoreticians saw that in 
addition to simply marshaling available empirical evidence, 
CSR would clearly benefit from taking the additional step of 
becoming an experimental science (Barrett and Lawson, 2001; 
Boyer and Ramble, 2001; Atkinson and Whitehouse, 2010).  
Experiments not only test theories, they produce (new) 
empirical evidence. Testing theories experimentally helps to 
guard against the biases that may influence theoretical parti-
sans’ selections among already available, less systematic, em-
pirical evidence that they cite in support of their theories. Ex-
perimentation enables scientists to target precisely those “parts 
of that landscape that are of greatest interest.” The process of 
managing unexpected experimental results theoretically may 
not prevent confirmation bias in scientists, but it does tend to 
make it more conspicuous when it arises (McCauley, 2011).  
Speculative theoretical ventures like CSR eventually re-
quire the kind of systematic support from the bottom-up that 
elaborate programs of experimentation furnish. Scientific 
theories should not only be able to fly. They should also be able 
to land. When theoreticians assemble existing evidence, they 
are, in effect, carefully selecting spots, surveyed from above, to 
bring their theoretical aircraft in for a landing. By noting this, 
I do not intend to be dismissive. Touching down on the hard 
surfaces of the facts like that is an accomplishment; however, 
experimentation forces theories to the ground at points of in-
terest to those who are watching from below and negotiating 
conditions there. The more points on the map (i.e., the more 
facts designated by experimentation) where a theory can land 
safely, the more worthy it is.  
Their common assumptions notwithstanding, these 
early theories in CSR have never been fully integrated. Still, as 
research has proceeded these theoretical proposals have been 
expounded in ways that have revealed plentiful points of con-
tact and coincidences of views. What, finally, is of far greater 
usefulness, though, are their conflicts and disagreements both 
with one another and with other theories that have been pro-
posed subsequently (e.g., Bering, 2006), for they serve as in-
vitations to experimentalists to explore competing theories’ 
implications in unusual settings that allow for the control of 
the theoretically interesting variables.  
As noted, CSR began as a high-level, theoretical proj-
ect. Over the subsequent twenty-five years many of the as-
sociated programs of research have secured their credentials 
not only as empirical science but, in many cases, as experi-
mental science as well.7 Once experimentation commences 
in any science, it exhibits a dynamic of its own. Initial find-
ings from experiments aimed at testing big theories inevi-
tably spawn dozens of finer-grained hypotheses. Those hy-
potheses address what the experiments’ findings hint about 
potentially relevant variables. Reliably, some of those phe-
nomena prove to be, simultaneously, so complex and so the-
oretically suggestive that they become objects of sustained 
investigation on their own.
Within CSR various topics are receiving such on-go-
ing experimental investigation. These include such effects as 
theological incorrectness, promiscuous teleology, and char-
a eristic patterns of reasoning about dead agents’ minds as 
well as the mnemonic effects of minimally counter-intuitive 
representations and the consequences of ritual for building 
social cohesion and increasing cooperation within groups. 
(See the following sections below.) Beyond the sheer number 
of experimental papers that have appeared, perhaps the best 
evidence over the past fifteen years of CSR’s status as a ma-
turing experimental science is the emergence of such topics 
within its purview that have inspired this sort of prolonged 
and focused experimental scrutiny that takes on a life of its 
own. For more than a decade in each case these topics have 
attra ed the attention of several groups of researchers from 
around the world, who have examined their various facets in 
considerable detail.   
Further evidence of abundant fertile experimental 
research in CSR is the development of new theories built 
from the bottom-up. Possessing a collection of robust exper-
imental results that appear to be disparate is what typically 
leads to constructing theories in such a fashion. Theoreti-
cally-minded experimentalists propose a non-obvious prin-
7 During that time, CSR has arisen as a recognized contributor in religious studies with formal representation in some of the world’s larg-
est professional societies (International Association for the History of Religions, American Academy of Religion), a professional society 
of its own (International Association for the Cognitive Science of Religion -- IACSR), and specialized journals (Journal of the Cognitive 
Science of Religion, Journal of Cognition and Culture, Religion, Brain & Behavior, Journal of Cognitive Historiography). At the same 
time, it has also become a notable subfield within cognitive science with the IACSR regularly meeting periodically with and receiving 
formal recognition and support from the Cognitive Science Society, with papers and posters in the field accepted at that society’s an-
nual meetings, and with relevant articles by eminent mainstream cognitive scientists appearing in its flagship journal, Cognitive Science 
(Astuti and Harris, 2008; Banerjee et al., 2013; Legare and Souza, 2014).
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ciple underlying the apparent incongruities among the find-
ings as a means of integrating them theoretically (McCauley 
and Lawson, 1998).  
The parade case from recent work in CSR is the cog-
nitive resource depletion theory (Schjoedt et al., 2013). That 
theory proposes a unified treatment of the cognitive mecha-
nisms undergirding religious ritual. It groups three apparently 
disparate phenomena pertaining to ritual:
(1)  the persistent occurrence for participants in rituals 
of goal-demotion and causal opacity (Boyer and 
Liénard, 2006; Liénard and Boyer, 2006; Nielbo and 
Sørensen, 2011);
(2)  the negative effect on memory of the requirement, 
e ecially in high-arousal rituals, that participants 
suppress their emotional responses (Morinis, 1985; 
Xygalatas et al., 2013b), and 
(3)  the deference participants show to charismatic rit-
ual authorities about the performance and under-
standing of the rituals in question (Schjoedt et al., 
2011).
The theorists argue that each of these patterns involves 
the depletion of the cognitive resources that participants can 
bring to performing, remembering, and interpreting rituals. 
They maintain that, whether by swamping or by starving the 
relevant cognitive systems’ processors during ritual perfor-
mances, the resulting deprivations of processing resources cre-
ate opportunities for religious authorities to proffer accounts, 
either before or after the rituals’ performances, about what is 
transpiring. The theory proposes, in effect, that if people are 
daunted by mastering causally opaque details in their ritual 
a ions or by controlling themselves in the face of profoundly 
stimulating sensory pageantry and community engagement 
or by the expertise of a charismatic ritual officiant, they have 
little time or energy for encoding ritual details or pondering 
ritual meanings.
The cognitive resource depletion theory readily squares 
with the supposition that religious ritual systems have evolved 
to exploit these cognitive vulnerabilities. Such arrangements 
are likely to reduce the variability in these rites, which cre-
ates a space for cultural authorities to prescribe and regularize 
their performances and interpretations.
Three effects
Basic empirical outcomes sometimes, all by themselves, 
elicit extended “normal” scientific treatment (Kuhn, 1970). 
Conditional reasoning, flashbulb memory, the false belief 
task, and change blindness are examples in mainstream cog-
nitive science from the past few decades. Such continued re-
search on these and other phenomena within the cognitive 
and psychological sciences is part of the reason why Robert 
Cummins (2000) has stressed that the psychological scienc-
es’ principal accomplishments are the discovery of effects (the 
von Re orff Effect [von Re orff, 1933], the Stroop Effect 
[Stroop, 1935], the phoneme re oration effect [Warren, 
1970], the SNARC effect [Dehaene and Mehler 1992], etc.), 
rather than the formulation of laws.
CSR offers illustrations of Cummins’ (2000) observa-
tion that the sciences of the mind  ecialize in the discov-
ery and articulation of effects. Effects are patterns in human 
performance that are pervasive, but about which people are 
often inattentive, if not unconscious. Effects supply insights 
about how human minds work. For example, the Spacing 
Effect (e.g., Madigan, 1969) is the finding that distributed 
pra ice with materials increases the probability of their long-
term retention in memory more than the same amount of 
massed pra ice does. If occasions for rehearsal are spaced out 
over time, memory performance is likely to exceed that from 
employing some small number of massed pra ice sessions of 
comparable duration. 
Effects also inspire extensive programs of experimental 
research.  
Theological incorrectness
Perhaps the best-known effect arising from experimen-
tal research in CSR is the proclivity for theological incorrect-
ness. Recondite theological formulations routinely feature 
counter-intuitive representations. Their counter-intuitive-
ness, however, is profuse, not minimal. The theologically 
correct Christian God, for example, is all-good, all-seeing, 
all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-present. The theologi-
cally-informed religiosity of educated participants in large-
scale, literate societies regularly employs representations that 
are nearly, if not equally, as radically counter-intuitive as the 
representations scientific theories employ (McCauley, 2011).
Carefully formulated, theologically correct texts com-
monly issue from years of conte ation and debate. Schol-
ars may overplay their prominence, at least with regard to 
their influence on participants’ religious understandings 
and inferential predilections.  Justin Barrett and Frank Keil 
(1996; Barrett, 1998) furnish evidence that in on-line tasks, 
such as processing and recalling narratives, religious people 
overwhelmingly utilize conceptions driven by the implicit 
assumptions associated with various unconscious, task- e-
cific systems that appear to underlie so much of popular 
religious cognition. They designed short narratives about 
intera ions between people and God to be consistent with 
the theologically correct doctrines, which their experimen-
tal participants affirmed when they were directly queried 
about their beliefs. The participants offered up conventional, 
theologically-correct, non-anthropomorphic conceptions of 
God that constitute the orthodox beliefs of their doctrinal 
religious systems. Instead of deploying those theological-
ly complex, ecclesiastically approved and policed concepts, 
which they endorsed when questioned directly, Barrett and 
Keil’s experimental participants frequently revert to sponta-
neous, theologically incorrect conceptions in their recollections 
of these narratives. Participants reason about God on-the-fly 
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similarly to how they reason about Superman. Of course, Su-
perman is an extraordinary chara er too. But being stron-
ger than a locomotive, moving faster than a  eeding bullet, 
leaping tall buildings in a single bound, and having X-ray 
vision still falls a good deal short of omnipotence, omnipres-
ence, and omniscience. Barrett and Keil obtained the same 
findings when the task is merely to paraphrase, rather than 
recall, the narratives – even when participants have full access 
to the texts they are paraphrasing throughout the task! They 
obtained such findings with Christians and Jews in Ameri-
ca and with Hindus in India. ( Jason Slone [2004] outlined 
multiple lines of evidence for similar patterns in additional 
religions.) Religious participants explicitly affirm theologi-
cally correct propositions; they often memorize theologically 
approved doctrines and learn a good deal of theology them-
selves (Peterson, 2013), but it does not follow that any of this 
substantially influences how they think and reason on-line 
about religious matters in ordinary settings.
Emma Cohen in her ethnography (2007) and in her 
experimental work with Barrett (2008a, 2008b) marshals 
evidence indicating that theological incorrectness occurs 
even in unpretentious settings in which scholarly sophistica-
tion and ecclesiastical hierarchy are meager. They show that 
theologically incorrect ideas readily intrude in the thought of 
followers of a small Brazilian spirit-possession cult. In order 
to handle a variety of theological complications, such as a 
possessing spirit showing strikingly different personality traits 
when possessing different people at different times, the cult 
leader teaches that spirit possession involves the fusion of the 
possessing spirit with the mind of the host. Spirit fusion, how-
ever, neither squares with folk psychology nor delivers much 
inferential potential. It is a substantially counter-intuitive no-
tion that does not comport very well with theory of mind. 
Cohen found that participants in the spirit-possession cult 
(and she and Barrett found that experimental participants in 
other cultures) virtually unanimously opted for the intuitive 
view (regularly portrayed in Hollywood movies) that the pos-
sessing spirit displaces the host’s spirit, instead. Interestingly, 
people seem less troubled by the complications that accompa-
ny this view, such as what the host’s spirit is up to and where 
it resides when it has been displaced.  
The automatic intrusion of these maturationally natural 
intuitive mental systems guarantees the repeated eruption of 
theological incorrectness, no matter how humble the religious 
system. These are instances of a general pattern in which re-
curring intuitive assumptions connected with basement level 
cognitive systems intrude in thought and can trump pains-
takingly acquired reflective knowledge, whether theological 
or scientific (McCauley, 2011).  
Promiscuous teleology
A second seminal finding in CSR, which has also sus-
tained an on-going program of research, concerns an effect 
that Deborah Kelemen (1999a) has dubbed “promiscuous 
teleology.” Kelemen first carried out experimental studies 
(1999a, 1999b) supporting the position that children find 
function, purpose, and design throughout the natural world. 
She documented pre-school age children’s inclination to 
over-attribute functions to things as a result of their new 
facility with theory of mind and growing experience with 
purposeful agents pursuing goal-directed a ions. Unlike 
educated American adults, most children this age are will-
ing to attribute functions to entire organisms (e.g., tigers) 
as well as to natural objects (e.g., icebergs), their parts (e.g., 
a mountain protuberance), and their properties (e.g., the 
pointiness of rocks).   
In subsequent research Kelemen and her colleagues 
have produced grounds for su ecting that the penchant for 
promiscuous teleology may extend beyond childhood. In ex-
periments with Romani adults, Krista Casler and Kelemen 
(2008) provide evidence against the assumption that the 
discontinuities between children’s teleological promiscuous-
ness and adults’ apparent abstemiousness are the inevitable 
outcomes of development. Like the children Kelemen has 
studied, uneducated Romani adults differ significantly from 
educated Romani adults and from educated American adults 
in their willingness to approve teleological explanations for 
natural objects.  
Education matters, but does it suffice to extinguish pro-
miscuous teleology? Kelemen and Evelyn Rosset (2009) ob-
tained experimental evidence indicating that, at least under 
some conditions, it does not. They had educated participants, 
who had, on average, completed 2.5 college level science 
classes, assess the worthiness of proposed explanations for a 
range of natural phenomena. Participants who were forced to 
do the task fast (they had 3.2 seconds to read and respond 
to each item) proved significantly more likely to endorse in-
correct teleological explanations than those not under such 
time-pressures. They did so, even though the  eeded condi-
tions had no effect on those participants’ accuracy with regard 
to control items. They also found that similar percentages 
of participants assented to some unwarranted teleological 
explanations (e.g., “the earth has an ozone layer to protect it 
from UV light”, p. 140) in all conditions, time-pressured or 
not. An additional study revealed that educated adults with 
some experience of college level science appear to think that 
“natural phenomena exist to benefit each other...” and are “in-
trinsically directed towards survival  [...] and maintaining the 
Earth’s natural equilibrium” (p. 141). Crucially, they did not 
restrict such judgments to biological phenomena. Kelemen 
et al. (2013) found a similar proclivity for teleological expla-
nation of non-biological natural phenomena in experienced, 
Ph.D. level, physical scientists with appointments at major 
American research universities, when they too had to make 
time-pressured assessments of explanations.  
Assembling evidence from a wide array of developmen-
tal research in addition to that for children’s teleological pro-
miscuousness, Kelemen (2004, p. 295) has proposed that they 
are “intuitive theists,” i.e., that they are naturally inclined to re-
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gard natural objects as “nonhuman artifacts” that reflect “non-
human design.” She argues that by school age children possess 
the requisite mental capacities for thinking about intangible 
agents8, their mental states and design intentions, and the 
(possible) role of the latter in determining objects’ purposes. 
She notes that the view squares with Margaret Evans’ (2000, 
2001) findings that up to the age of ten children prefer “cre-
ationist” explanations of natural objects, regardless of their 
upbringing or of their parents’ views about religion. It also 
comports with Barrett’s arguments that young children’s dif-
ficulties with the possibility of others having false beliefs, iron-
ically, indicates that they are better equipped to understand 
infallible minds than they are the minds of humans (Barrett 
et al., 2001; Barrett, 2012). Presumably, Kelemen’s subsequent 
research on promiscuous teleology in adults (outlined above) 
adds to the plausibility of her suggestion (2004, p. 299) that 
adults, at least in their own less cautious ruminations, are also 
inclined to presume design intentionally imposed on things 
throughout their natural surroundings. 
Dead agents’ minds
Jesse Bering and David Bjorklund (2004) produced a 
body of findings that points to a third, hitherto unnamed ef-
fect concerning human reasoning about dead agents’ minds 
that points to intuitive presumptions about minds outliving 
bodies. They first demonstrated what might be dubbed the 
“Dead Agents’ Minds Effect” in preschoolers and kindergar-
teners. Although these young children held discontinuity 
views about biological functions concerning a dead mouse 
(for example, they did not think that the mouse would ever 
need to go to the bathroom again), large majorities spurned 
such discontinuities with regard to the mouse’s psychobiolog-
ical or cognitive states.  Substantial majorities of these young 
children thought that the mouse was still hungry (as he was 
when he died) and that he still wanted to go home (as he was 
attempting when he met his end).  
It is not until late-elementary-school-age that clear 
majorities of Bering and Bjorklund’s participants affirmed 
discontinuity views about the psychobiological and cognitive 
states of dead agents’ minds. This group was, however, the 
only group in this study that showed a significant difference 
in their responses to these two question types.  Significantly 
more late-elementary-school-age children certified disconti-
nuities about psychobiological states than did so with regard 
to the cognitive states of dead agents’ minds.  
Bering and Bjorklund’s work parallels Kelemen’s propos-
al about intuitive theism in at least two important re ects. 
First, they supplied evidence that children’s inclinations to-
ward continuity views about dead agents’ minds, although 
probably enhanced by religious indoctrination, did not de-
pend upon it (Bering et al., 2005). Second, what, initially, 
looked like a pattern among youngsters proved, upon further 
experimental investigation, to be manifest in adults as well.  
In a further experiment Bering and Bjorklund examined 
participants’ views about post-mortem organismic and men-
tal states at a much finer grain than in their earlier studies, and 
they did so not only with kindergarteners and late-elementa-
ry-school-age children but also with college-age adults. In this 
experiment Bering and Bjorklund posed multiple questions 
about biological states (e.g., “Do you think that Baby Mouse 
will ever need to drink water again?”), psychobiological states 
(e.g., “Do you think that Baby Mouse is still hungry?”), per-
ceptual states (e.g., “Do you think that Baby Mouse can see 
where he is now?”), desires (e.g., “Do you think that Baby 
Mouse still wants to go home?”), emotional states (e.g., “Do 
you think that Baby Mouse is still sad because he can’t find his 
way home?”), and epistemic states (e.g., “Do you think that 
Baby Mouse knows that he’s not alive?”). This experiment ba-
sically replicated the findings of Bering and Bjorklund’s earlier 
experiments with the kindergarteners and the late-elementa-
ry-school-age children.
The pivotal findings of the experiment, though, con-
cerned the adults’ responses. First, like the late-elementa-
ry-school-age children, the adults were significantly more 
likely than the kindergarteners to support discontinuity views 
with regard to the biological, psychobiological, perceptual, and 
emotional states as well as with regard to desires. This was not 
true, though, with regard to the mouse’s epistemic states. Sec-
ond, again like the late-elementary-school-age children, the 
adults were significantly more likely than the kindergarteners 
to be consistent discontinuity theorists, i.e., to give discontinuity 
responses to every question of a particular type.
Their findings with their adult participants provided evi-
dence for two conclusions. First, discontinuity views about the 
organismic and mental states of dead agents would appear to 
be learned, as is, presumably, the view that death involves the 
extinction of the mind, from which such discontinuity views 
follow. Bering and Bjorklund found a significant effect for age 
group with regard to discontinuity responses. Late-elemen-
tary-school-age children gave more discontinuity responses 
than kindergarteners and adults gave more still and both dif-
fered significantly from the kindergarteners on this front.  
Second, although large numbers of adults explicitly 
avowed extinctionist views about dead agents’ minds, many 
did not seem to subscribe to that view when making judg-
ments about the possibilities pertaining to the more purely 
psychological states of dead agents’ minds. Only half of the 
adults were consistent discontinuity theorists with regard to 
epistemic states, in particular. Subsequent research has shown 
that what is, in effect, religious priming can amplify such ef-
fects (Harris and Gimenéz, 2005; Astuti and Harris, 2008). 
K. Mitch Hodge (2011) argues that both Bering and Bjork-
8 Exactly how direct the roles of such theory of mind capacities and of promiscuous teleology are in any such intuitive theism is a point 
of controversy (Lindeman et al., 2015). 
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lund’s findings as well as these priming effects depend, more 
fundamentally, on humans’ abilities to carry out off-line social 
reasoning about absent agents. 
Minimally counter-intuitive 
religious representations
Pascal Boyer’s (1994, 2001) account of the cognitive 
bases of religious representations has inspired several studies 
exploring his contention that religions’ minimally counter-in-
tuitive representations enjoy a mnemonic advantage over 
unproblematic, intuitive representations (no matter how 
strange or unusual) and over substantially counter-intuitive 
representations.9
The diversity of religious representations can seem 
overwhelming. Boyer argues, however, that they are signifi-
cantly constrained. Humans’ unconscious inferences about 
“intuitive ontology” (2001) figure centrally in Boyer’s expla-
nation. Intuitive ontologies constitute foundational theories 
about kinds of things in the world.
Boyer maintains that religious ontologies follow a stan-
dard pattern. Religious concepts violate expectations associ-
ated with some member of a small set of intuitive ontological 
categories, while preserving all of that category’s further default 
inferences.  That set consists of ANIMAL, PERSON, TOOL, 
NATURAL OBJECT, and PLANT. Violations of physical, 
biological, or psychological properties yield concepts with 
counter-intuitive properties, exemplified by walking on water, 
immortality, and knowing other peoples’ thoughts, re ec-
tively. Those violations are of two sorts. Breaches occur when 
something transgresses a principle of folk-physics, folk-biolo-
gy, or folk-psychology that ordinarily applies. A person who 
passes through walls violates intuitive physics. A person who 
is the offspring of a lion breaches our folk biological expecta-
tions. Transfers occur when properties are assigned to items 
that do not possess them. Talk about a mountain that is alive 
transfers a collection of biological properties to a natural ob-
ject. Claims about a snake that talks transfer a collection of 
sophisticated psychological capacities to an organism without 
them. Usually these representations involve only one viola-
tion in each instance; thus, they are minimally counter-intu-
itive (MCI).10  
Boyer hypothesizes that MCI concepts enjoy an ad-
vantage from the standpoint of competition for humans’ at-
tentions, as they approximate a cognitive optimum. First, all 
counter-intuitive concepts are attention grabbing. Counter-in-
tuitiveness is not the only way to get noticed, but it suffices. 
Second, MCI concepts retain substantial inferential potential. 
An MCI concept’s single violation leaves its abundant infer-
ential power basically intact. Moses may have parted the Red 
Sea, but we can still infer that he would have made a splash 
had he jumped in, that his heart was beating throughout the 
episode, and that he would have expected that the subsequent 
inundation of the Egyptians would interrupt their pursuit. 
These are but three unsurprising inferences, which follow 
from this story that contains the concept PERSON WHO 
PARTED THE RED SEA. Boyer accentuates the instanta-
neousness and alacrity with which humans carry out such 
inferences and the wealth of inferences available.  
The memorability of MCI concepts is a third consider-
ation contributing to their selective advantage. MCI concepts 
not only fascinate, they tend to stick, which is necessary for 
their transmission. Various experimentalists have te ed this 
hypothesis about MCI concepts’ mnemonic advantages. Ear-
ly studies obtained the predicted effects (Boyer and Ramble, 
2001; Barrett and Nyhof, 2001). In assorted cultural and reli-
gious settings on four continents MCI concepts were remem-
bered significantly better than 
•  normal, intuitive concepts (e.g., a person who delivers 
thoughtful sermons and sleeps at night), 
•  highly unusual but not counter-intuitive concepts (e.g., 
a chocolate table)
•  substantially counter-intuitive concepts that involve 
many violations of intuitive assumptions (e.g., a statue 
that hears and answers prayers, weeps and bleeds, and 
flies around at night).11
Researchers have examined what role other variables 
may play in facilitating the recollection of MCI concepts. 
Those variables include imagery (Slone et al., 2007), causal 
integration (Harmon-Vukić and Slone, 2009), background 
knowledge and narrative context (Gonce et al., 2006; Upal et 
al., 2007), and the amount of cognitive processing the concept 
demands (Harmon-Vukić et al., 2012). In each case, the mne-
monic advantage accruing to MCI concepts generally stands. 
Moreover, in these and other studies (e.g., Norenzayan et al., 
2006) that advantage increases as retention intervals increase. 
This was e ecially true with retention intervals measured in 
months, which would seem to be the time frames most rele-
vant to matters of cultural transmission (Barrett and Nyhof, 
2001).  Recent experiments indicate that the heightened 
memorability of MCI concepts holds for children as young as 
seven (Banarjee et al., 2013).  
Occasionally religious representations incorporate more 
than one violation of humans’ ontological intuitions. Moses, 
for example, has a conversation with a burning bush that is not 
consumed. Thus, I have sugge ed that “MCI” might be bet-
ter construed as modestly counter-intuitive (McCauley, 2011). 
Konika Banarjee and her colleagues (2013), in fact, have pro-
9 This includes the radically counter-intuitive representations in which the sciences traffic (McCauley, 2011). 
10 For an extended, systematic treatment of the issues at stake, see Barrett (2008). 
11 Referring to these as “maximally counter-intuitive” representations is an unhelpful convention (e.g., Norenzayan et al., 2006).  Obvi-
ously, the number of violations exceeds one, but this hardly makes them maximally counter-intuitive.
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vided experimental evidence that suggests that the mnemon-
ic advantage for counter-intuitive concepts extends to two 
violations. They found that seven-to-nine year-old children 
showed significantly better recall both directly and after one 
week for concepts involving either one or two, but not three, 
violations of intuitive ontology, relative to intuitive concepts.   
New directions
Like cognitive science more generally, CSR has expand-
ed in a variety of new directions in the twenty-first century. 
The field has attra ed greater numbers of researchers, and 
those researchers have simultaneously advanced new the-
oretical proposals and introduced many new ways to test 
them. They have enlisted methods from across the social, 
cognitive, and brain sciences. The following three subsections 
will briefly discuss empirical research that simultaneously 
exhibits: (a) three of these new methods (economic games, 
brain imaging, and physiological measures in the field) and 
(b) three of the most conspicuous new directions for research 
in CSR (evolutionary theorizing, cognitive neuroscience, and 
religious experience).  
These three new directions for research are by no means 
unique to CSR. They echo research trends across the cogni-
tive sciences.  
Evolutionary theorizing
The many controversies they have provoked notwith-
standing, the emergence of  (1) sociobiology (Wilson, 1975), 
(2) theories of cultural evolution (Boyd and Richerson, 1985; 
Richerson and Boyd, 2006; Henrich, 2016), and (3) evo-
lutionary psychology (Barkow et al., 1992; Buss 2005), has 
reintroduced reflection on the evolutionary foundations of 
cognition and mental life that had, for various reasons, been 
largely moribund for more than seventy years. Because it con-
nected so directly with an existing experimental paradigm of 
longstanding interest, viz., the Wason selection task (1966 
and 1968), Leda Cosmides’ (1989) discoveries about the cru-
cial influence of social exchange on conditional inference in 
that task and the voluminous literature that it subsequently 
spawned thrust evolutionary considerations into cognitive 
science. The productive research programs associated with 
the alliance between evolutionary psychology (Barrett, 2015) 
and cultural group selection and cultural evolution (Henrich, 
2016) ensure they will not be going away.  
It is probably not a coincidence that all of the first gener-
ation contributors in CSR were by-product theorists. Among 
that group, it was Boyer (1994, 2001) who developed what 
was the most elaborate evolutionary account of religious 
cognition. Evolutionary psychologists’ commitments to the 
domain  ecificity of numerous cognitive systems, e ecial-
ly, have informed Boyer’s proposals about religious cognition 
from the outset. Subsequent researchers (such as Bulbulia, 
2004; Bering, 2006) have wedded their views of religious cog-
nition more directly to natural selection, arguing on a variety 
of grounds that humans’ have religious cognitive proclivities 
because those proclivities are individually adaptive. They 
maintain that religious sensibilities have aided individuals in 
passing on their genes. 
Those hypotheses typically move in either or both of 
two directions. The first stresses the beneficial impact of re-
ligious participation on human health and well-being (e.g., 
Bulbulia, 2006). The second concerns the ways in which re-
ligious beliefs, e ecially those about the gods’ concerns with 
human conduct, encourage behaviors that are likely to make 
individuals trusted members of their social groups (e.g., Ber-
ing, 2006). Whether their behaviors concern exhibitions of 
fidelity to the group and the group’s gods, trustworthiness in 
moral matters, or both, the general proposal is that persons 
with such dispositions will, on average, have greater success 
obtaining resources and mates. Their compatriots will be 
more likely to enter into productive relationships – in all of 
the relevant senses – with such individuals, since their pen-
chant for religious belief and deportment makes them good 
people with whom to cooperate. These circumstances should 
enable them to leave more copies of their genes, all else being 
equal, in the next generation.  
Embracing explanatory pluralism inevitably produces 
pressures for broad interpretations of cognitive science, the 
fairly traditional conceptions of some theories in CSR not-
withstanding (e.g., Lawson and McCauley, 1990). With re-
gard to any particular explanatory question, how narrowly or 
how widely cognition and the scientific enterprises that study 
it should be construed should turn primarily on the produc-
tivity of theoretical proposals, the empirical findings those 
proposals motivate, and how those theories and findings bear 
on the range of questions inquirers wish to explore. There is 
no such thing as a complete explanation in science. Thus, prin-
cipled arguments for or against narrower or broader concep-
tions of cognitive science are probably misplaced. Instead of 
casting cognitive explanations exclusively in terms of internal 
rules and representations, 4E cognitive science stresses that 
cognition is typically embodied, ena ed, embedded, and ex-
tended (Menary, 2010). It surely is. For many purposes, in-
cluding some that have arisen within CSR, however, 4E cog-
nitive science is at least 1E too few.12 The evidence that many 
forms of human cognition are evolved equals or exceeds that 
for any of the more celebrated E’s (Buss, 2005).  
CSR theorists, who construe at least some religious 
belief and behavior as adaptations at the individual level, 
have enlisted methodological, theoretical, and evidential re-
sources from evolutionary research in the biological scienc-
12 Arguably, it is probably 2E’s too few. In addition to the importance of attending to cognition as evolved, it seems worthwhile to rec-
ognize how richly textured cognition is emotionally as well (Thagard, 2006). 
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es and, e ecially, in biological anthropology (e.g., Bulbulia 
and Sosis, 2011). A particularly influential study for subse-
quent cognitive theorists has been a collaboration between 
Richard Sosis, a behavioral ecologist, and Bradley J. Ruffle, 
an economist, exploring the role of religious ritual in forging 
intragroup cooperation to the benefit, presumably, of each 
of the cooperators (Sosis and Ruffle, 2003). The study ex-
hibits how tools and methods from the social and cognitive 
sciences, viz., economic games, can be deployed to test such 
evolutionary hypotheses.
Sosis and Ruffle take advantage of existing arrange-
ments in Israel to compare cooperation among members 
within religious as opposed to secular kibbutzim. They test 
the hypothesis that ritual participation builds cooperation. 
Current circumstances already lend indirect evidence to 
hypotheses about the beneficial effects of common religious 
affiliation. On virtually every relevant front (profitability, 
retention of members, longevity, etc.) religious kibbutzim 
on average fare better than do secular kibbutzim in contem-
porary Israel. Consequently, in order to have greater control 
on as many theoretically extraneous social and economic 
variables as possible, Sosis and Ruffle carried out the non-re-
ligious half of their study in some of the very most successful 
secular kibbutzim.  
Sosis and Ruffle compared kibbutz members’ perfor-
mance in an economic game as a measure of their coopera-
tiveness. They used real money in a common-pool resource 
dilemma game, in which two members of the same kibbutz 
play together anonymously. Both players know that the ini-
tial pool is one hundred Israeli shekels (equivalent to about 
twenty-five US dollars) and that each of them will propose to 
withdraw some amount. The rules are simple. If the sum of 
the two players’ proposed withdrawals exceeds one hundred 
shekels, then neither player receives anything. If the sum of 
the two equals one hundred shekels, then each player receives 
exactly the amount that he or she proposed to withdraw. 
If the sum of the two withdrawals is less than one hundred 
shekels, then each player receives not only the amount that 
he or she proposed to withdraw but in addition three fourths 
times whatever remains from the one hundred shekels after 
both withdrawals have been made. Sosis and Ruffle presume 
that common-pool resource dilemma games are reasonably 
good models for the use of common resources, such as wa-
ter or electricity, on a kibbutz. Crucially, both players stand 
to benefit more if they can trust one another to make small 
withdrawals from the original one hundred shekels.
Sosis and Ruffle’s study revealed significant differences 
between the performances in this game of members from 
religious as opposed to secular kibbutzim. The members of 
religious kibbutzim withdrew significantly smaller amounts 
from the initial one hundred shekel pool than did members 
of the secular kibbutzim. The study supplied further evi-
dence, though, that this result may well have been the effect 
of participation in collective public rituals. In fact, the differ-
ence between the two groups was a function of the proposed 
withdrawals of the male members of the religious kibbutzim 
and, in particular, of the proposed withdrawals of the male 
members who participated in collective, public, ritual praying 
three times each day. Female players from religious kibbutzim 
did not propose withdrawals that differed significantly from 
those of players from secular kibbutzim. Although females in 
religious kibbutzim carry out rituals, those a ivities are most-
ly done domestically in private. 
In some brief introductory comments Sosis and Ruffle 
frame their findings in terms of costly signaling theory (e.g., 
Irons, 2001). That theory proposes that participating in rit-
uals communicates to other members an individual’s com-
mitment to the group. Basically, the more costly the ritual is, 
e.g., costly initiation rites that include adopting group mark-
ers (Whitehouse, 1996), the more convincing the signal is to 
the group.  Participation in such rituals are hard-to-fake, high 
cost signals to the community that the participants are reli-
able group members, who will not defect. After all, by partic-
ipating in such rituals participants have paid a non-trivial cost 
in time, energy, and material resources. Both participating in 
the ritual and adopting group markers, such as scarification, 
chara eristic clothing, or food taboos, requires that group 
members surrender various opportunities to pursue their 
own interests.  
Since evolutionary thinking examines changes in large-
scale systems over the long-term (McCauley, 2009) rather 
than proximate cognitive mechanisms, much of that research 
is cognition-blind. The influence of Sosis and Ruffle’s findings 
on subsequent research in CSR (e.g., Whitehouse and Lan-
man, 2014), notwithstanding, in fact, they do not discuss cog-
nition. Joseph Henrich (2009) stresses, however, that costly 
signaling theory leaves questions about proximate mecha-
nisms unaddressed. Henrich notes that costly signaling the-
ory does not tackle either the group dynamics or the histori-
cal processes from which such patterns arise. It also offers no 
account of the underlying psychological processes involved. 
It explains neither why costly requirements will increase 
commitments to beliefs, nor why costly signals seem less cost-
ly to insiders, nor when or why the production of costly sig-
nals reaches a ceiling.13  
Henrich argues for the pivotal psychological role of cred-
ibility enhancing displays (CREDs) in explaining the import 
of costly signals. In addition to the content biases in cognition, 
which Boyer deploys so effectively to explain the chara er of 
religious representations, Henrich (2016) argues that human 
beings also possess evolved context biases in cognition as well. 
Specifically, as cultural learners, Henrich proposes that human 
beings have an evolved disposition to attend to prestigious 
individuals (Henrich and Gil-White, 2001). Because pres-
13 Henrich’s observations illustrate lessons of explanatory pluralism: science does not traffic in comprehensive explanations; the vindica-
tion of an explanatory theory simply occasions a new set of questions about its un-explicated details and its further implications.
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tigious people have either expertise in some area of human 
endeavor or sound judgment or both, prestigious people are 
good people to model. Focusing on CREDs, Henrich suggests, 
constitutes a kind of cultural immune system in that CREDs 
signal to cultural learners the models’ reliability with regard 
to their avowed commitments to the group, to the cause, to 
the beliefs, etc. Psychologically, the fact that everyone under-
stands that cultural learners attend to models’ CREDs (or 
lack thereof) decreases the possibilities that those models are 
self-intere edly manipulating cultural learners.  
Certainly, costly signals are a variety of CREDs, but by 
no means do they exhaust the category. If prestigious models 
recommend some unfamiliar food and then, in fact, do such 
things as eat it themselves and feed it to their kin, they have 
not only exhibited a CRED, they and their kin have benefitted 
from the nourishment. Not all CREDs are costly. Preliminary 
experimentation with both adults and children indicates the 
value of CREDs for the cultural transmission of both pra ic-
es and beliefs (Willard et al., n.d.)  
CREDs explain the prominence and influence that lead-
ers, who have made costly sacrifices, possess. Religious leaders, 
who forego wealth and sex or, in some cases, even their lives, 
demonstrate their good faith, so to  eak, and increase the 
probabilities of the transmission of their religions. As Hen-
rich comments (2016, p. 330), “CREDs can turn pain into 
pleasure and make martyrs into the most powerful of cultur-
al transmitters.” An evolved psychology of prestige underlies 
cultural learners’ willingness to follow religious leaders who 
consistently produce CREDs.  
Cognitive neuroscience
In their landmark article on cognitive science in the 
twentieth century, William Bechtel, Adele Abrahamsen, and 
George Graham (1998) stress that different disciplines among 
the several cognitive sciences enjoyed particular prominence 
for intervals across the time period in question. For exam-
ple, the advent of the digital computer and the advances in 
computational theory after the Second World War endowed 
work in computer science and artificial intelligence during 
the first two decades of cognitive science with a certain pride 
of place. The prominence of the neurosciences in twenty-first 
century cognitive science has also resulted from new technol-
ogies, though these have to do with brain imaging.  
The ability to view structure and a ivity in human 
brains non-invasively has not only provided far more direct 
access to the central mechanisms of human cognition. It has 
also occasioned the development of inter-level theorizing and 
research integrating insights and findings from across the 
social, psychological, and brain sciences. These new imag-
ing technologies have also furnished substantial, new bodies 
of evidence bearing on those hypotheses. Researchers from 
across the cognitive sciences have brought a variety of famil-
iar tasks from experimental work in psychology and econom-
ics into the scanner to ascertain the impact of various stimuli 
on cognition and decision-making. No work in CSR better 
illustrates such developments than Uffe Schjoedt and his col-
leagues’ study (2011) of the influence of perceived charisma 
on the cognitive processing of believers  noted earlier.  
Employing functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI), the Schjoedt team explored the effect of different 
 eakers’ perceived (religious) qualifications on listeners’ re-
sponses to those  eakers’ spoken prayers. The researchers 
examined participants’ responses to the spoken intercessory 
prayers of three individuals, whom they were told differed in 
their religious statuses. One was described as a non-Chris-
tian; the second was described as a Christian, and the third 
was described as a Christian “known for his healing powers” 
(Schjoedt et al., 2011, p. 120).  (Assignments of these religious 
qualifications to the  eakers were counter-balanced between 
participants.) Half of the participants were self-described 
Christian believers, while the other half were non-believers 
who were comparatively inexperienced with prayer and re-
lated religious matters. As a control the listeners also heard 
non-religious  eech with the same structure as prayer. Par-
ticipants also responded to two questionnaires. The first, 
which was administered before the scan, assessed the charac-
ter and level of their religiosity and experience with religious 
matters. The second, which was administered after the scan, 
inquired about their experiences of the three  eakers in the 
experiment and of God’s presence while they were listening 
to the three.  
Responses to the first questionnaire provided ample evi-
dence for the religiosity of the religious participants, who held 
traditional beliefs with self-described conviction and who had 
considerable experience with standard religious forms and 
pra ices. By contrast, the secular participants did not believe 
in God and they did not pray.  
Responses to the second questionnaire indicated that 
the Christian participants rated the charisma of the reputed 
Christian  eakers known for their healing powers signifi-
cantly higher than that for the alleged non-Christian  eak-
ers, whereas the secular participants showed no significant 
differences between their ratings of the various  eakers. The 
two groups showed even greater disparity with regard to their 
feelings of God’s presence during the various prayers that they 
heard during the experiment.    
To ascertain whether the researchers’ hypothesis that 
participants’ views of the various  eakers’ religious qualifi-
cations would have an impact on their neural a ivity, they 
compared a ivity levels across a host of the participants’ 
brain areas, as measured by the blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) imaging of their brains in fMRI scans.  Their study 
uncovered a number of striking patterns.  
Only the Christian participants’ neural a ivity showed 
significant differences in their responses to the  eakers and 
only in the contrast between the supposed non-Christian 
 eakers and the  eakers who were putatively Christians 
known for having healing powers. To get a sense of the com-
parative size of the effects of these different  eakers on the 
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Christian participants’ neural a ivity, Schjoedt and his col-
leagues compared a ivations in the five areas of participants’ 
brains that showed the most extreme differences in response 
to the two  eakers with their measures of baseline a ivity 
for those areas, which they had also obtained. Crucially, in all 
five areas, levels of neural a ivity were less than baseline for 
the Christian  eakers known for their healing powers and 
more than baseline for the non-Christian  eakers. These 
patterns also held for the Christian participants’ responses to 
the post-scan questionnaires. Dea ivation also correlated in-
versely with participants’ reports about their feelings of God’s 
presence, and the Christian participants’ post-scan ratings of 
God’s presence and of the  eakers’ charisma were strongly 
positively correlated.
The brain areas (medial prefrontal cortex, the temporo-
parietal junction, the temporopolar area, and the precuneus), 
which exhibited what the researchers described as “massive 
dea ivation” in response to the reputed Christian  eakers 
with healing abilities, concern social cognition and executive 
function. These are areas that are centrally involved in hu-
mans’ negotiation of their complex social worlds and their 
experiences of decision-making in that domain and others. 
The researchers note that their study involved a “passive par-
adigm,” in which participants simply listened to the  eakers 
praying without knowing that they would be asked to assess 
them afterward. The Schjoedt team (2011, p. 126) proposes 
that participants’ “trust in passive paradigms down regulate 
executive and social cognitive processing, because [they] sus-
pend or ‘hand over’ their critical faculty to the trusted person.” 
Their Danish Christian participants rated the alleged Chris-
tian  eakers with healing powers significantly more charis-
matic than the alleged non-Christian  eakers. Schjoedt et al. 
(2011, p. 127) suggest that such down regulation of neural 
a ivity in these brain regions may well be an earmark of fol-
lowers’ susceptibility to charismatic authority.  
Religious experience
Submission to charismatic authority may not leap to 
mind as a paradigmatic illustration of religious experience, 
but it is often a salient dimension of what happens to many 
people in the course of their religious lives. Theorists (e.g., 
Stark and Bainbridge, 1996), besides Max Weber, accord con-
siderable prominence to the influence of charismatic leaders 
in their general accounts of religion. Still, such features of 
people’s religious experience seem pedestrian by comparison 
with the wondrous goings-on routinely reported by venerat-
ed religious figures, saints, and mystics. 
 The first theories in CSR, given their focus on the trans-
mission of religious ideas, tended (at least compared to most 
other approaches in the study of religion) to downplay the 
importance of religious experience. The general contention 
(Sperber, 1996) was that no matter how exhilarating or in-
spiring participants’ experiences might prove, their trans-
mission is always subject to cognitive constraints on religious 
representations’ recognition, ability to attract attention, 
memorability, motivational impact, and communicability. 
Without packaging exhilaration and inspiration in a form 
that is readily transmittable, the relevant religious experienc-
es are a good deal less likely to make any decisive differences 
in a religious system’s fate.  
Still, these theorists did not ignore religious experience 
altogether. Boyer (2001) noted that powerful emotions are 
frequently elicited automatically when engaging many of 
the domain- ecific cognitive capacities that religions target 
-- from contamination avoidance, to kin detection, to fear 
of snakes, and more. Even if their principal concerns were 
mnemonic matters, both Whitehouse (1996) and McCau-
ley and Lawson (2002) were particularly intere ed in the 
emotional experiences that various religious rituals elicit 
in ritual patients. Again, though, such a ects of religious 
experience seem inconsequential when compared with the 
confrontations with the Cosmos, with the Holy, with the 
Mysterium Tremendum that many religious people suppos-
edly go through.  
For a variety of reasons, CSR has, more recently, turned 
its attentions to religious experience (e.g., Taves, 2009). Be-
yond the traditional, widespread interest in the topic, ample 
evidence exists for package-able religious technologies (from 
rituals, to disciplines, to mind-altering drugs) that kindle 
some of those attention-grabbing experiences. Two consid-
erations, however, are paramount. First, as the advocates of 
both 4E (and 6E!) cognitive science maintain, new tools and 
approaches (not just those of cognitive neuroscience) offer re-
sources for understanding the experiential dimensions of our 
cognitive processing. Second, not only religious experience 
but its ability to intrigue are never going away. That the topic 
would resurface prominently in CSR was inevitable.  
Dimitris Xygalatas, Ivana Konvalinka, and their col-
leagues’ studies (Xygalatas et al., 2011; Konvalinka et al., 
2011) of extreme rituals exemplify the sort of exciting new 
findings about the associated experiences that the tools of 
the cognitive sciences can produce. The Xygalatas-Konva-
linka team studied a fire-walking ceremony that concludes 
the annual festival of San Juan in the small Spanish village 
of San Pedro Manrique. The fire-walking occurs at mid-
night on the summer solstice in an arena that was  ecial-
ly constructed for this ceremony and accommodates 3000 
(approximately six times the population of the village). Ear-
lier in the evening the twenty-eight fire-walkers have pro-
cessed through the village to the venue, accompanied by the 
town eople. Over a half-hour, one by one the twenty-eight, 
usually carrying a friend or loved one on their backs, walked 
across a seven-meter bed of hot coals, which reached tem-
peratures of 677°C at the surface.   
The Xygalatas-Konvalinka team recognized the excit-
ing experimental opportunities in the natural (i.e., non-lab-
oratory) setting that this fire-walking ceremony presents. 
After earning the trust of the village leadership, the local 
town eople, and the fire-walkers themselves, they were per-
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mitted to introduce into the ceremony a number of controls 
and measurements that were unobtrusive and unproblematic 
from the standpoints of all involved. These included video re-
cording equipment for the purpose of memory research (Xy-
galatas et al., 2013b), but, most importantly, for my purposes 
here, twelve fire-walkers as well as twenty-six  ectators vol-
unteered to wear heart-rate monitors. All of the volunteers 
wore the monitors during the roughly thirty minutes it took 
for the twenty-eight fire-walkers to traverse the coals as well 
as during a thirty-minute interval one to three hours before 
the event (in order to obtain baseline heart-rate measures on 
all of the participants). Nine of the twenty-six  ectators who 
wore the heart-rate monitors were either relatives or friends 
of one or more of the fire-walkers, while the other seventeen, 
recruited at random, were unknown to the fire-walkers.  
Studying the correspondences between the fire-walkers 
and  ectators’ heart rates permitted the researchers to tease 
apart the synchronization of arousal in ritual from the syn-
chronization of bodily movements. Considerable experimen-
tal evidence (e.g., Cohen et al., 2010) indicates that synchro-
nized bodily movements create striking and similar responses 
among group members. Prolonged synchronous movements 
serve to align group members’ cognitive states and levels of 
emotional arousal, which, in turn, are presumed to result in 
an elevated sense of group solidarity.  
The empathetic projection hypothesis, at least in part, 
undergirds the second half of that story. That hypothesis 
holds that “it is the imagined responses of participants to focal 
events of the ritual that align their relevant cognitive states, 
without any strict need for orchestrated motor coordination” 
(Xygalatas et al., 2011, p. 735). The suggestion is that syn-
chronization of bodily movement is not necessary for such 
outcomes but is only a particularly popular means for orches-
trating arousal in common among group members.  However 
it is achieved, it is the common arousal that is the underlying 
mechanism for the sort of empathetic responses that build 
pro-social feelings among members of a group.  
The study offers more fine-grained scrutiny of the dy-
namics underlying that process. The Xygalatas-Konvalinka 
team su ected that, for people affiliated with one or more of 
the fire-walkers, simply observing a fire-walker might suffice to 
produce similar arousal. The findings they obtained from their 
study furnished stunning corroboration for that  eculation. 
Crucially, the data they obtained from the heart-rate monitors 
“revealed striking qualitative similarities during the ritual be-
tween the heart rates of fire-walkers and heart rates of relatives 
and friends, with no apparent similarity to nonrelated  ecta-
tors” (Konvalinka et al., 2011, p. 8515, emphasis added).  
These findings are significant on at least two import-
ant fronts pertaining to the chara er of many people’s reli-
gious experiences. First, they corroborated the empathetic 
projection hypothesis. Only the fire-walkers walked across 
the bed of hot coals, yet the heart-rates of the  ectators 
who identified themselves as either a relative or friend of a 
fire-walker did not differ significantly from the heart-rates 
of the firewalkers on all four of the heart-rate dynamics that 
the researchers measured. These affiliated  ectators who 
participated in the study had no physical contact with the 
fire-walkers during their walks, but their heart-rates tracked 
those of the fire-walkers not only during their walks but 
throughout the entire ceremony and, it turns out, even to 
some extent during the baseline epoch as well (Konvalinka et 
al., 2011, p. 8516-8517).  
Second, the effect is, at least in part, a function of so-
cial relationships. It does not turn exclusively on the brain’s 
mirroring capacities, which have attra ed so much atten-
tion over the past two decades (Rizzolatti et al., 2011). Even 
though all of the  ectators witnessed the fire-walking, it was 
only the heart-rates of the  ectators who were associates of a 
fire-walker that exhibited those qualitative similarities to the 
fire-walkers’ heart-rates. The non-affiliated  ectators who 
participated in the study were no less capable of mirroring 
the fire-walkers’ levels of arousal, as measured by their heart-
rates, but, in fact, they did not. Their heart rates on all four 
of the heart-rate dynamics that the researchers measured dif-
fered significantly from those of the fire-walkers.  
The Xygalatas-Konvalinka team’s study of the fire-walk-
ing at San Pedro Manrique provides a glimpse of the kinds 
of experimental controls, quantitative measures, descriptive 
precision, and rich insights that the theories and methods of 
CSR can supply for the study of at least some varieties of re-
ligious experience. On the one hand, their work contributes 
fundamentally to substantiating what are, in effect, theoreti-
cal proposals about religious experience from religious stud-
ies and the social sciences. On the other hand, this work and 
Xygalatas and his colleagues’ subsequent work in Mauritius 
(e.g., Xygalatas et al., 2013a) also model for experimentalists 
in the social, psychological, and brain sciences how to carry 
on fruitful experimentation utilizing physiological measures 
in the field.  
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